In this blog post, Srishti Singh, a student at KIIT Law School, Bhubaneshwar and pursuing a Diploma in Entrepreneurship Administration and Business Laws from NUJS, Kolkata, compares and contrasts between tax planning and tax evasion.
This article addresses the issues revolving around the conceptual meaning of Tax Planning and Tax Evasion. However, the article focuses on the moot point concentrating on the Tax Planning strategies employed in India and globally and the disguised form of tax evasion under the garb of Tax Planning. Whereas Tax Planning is the legal way of mitigation of taxes tax evasion is the avoidance of tax liability illegally through dishonest means. The article tries to explore into the ethical dimension of tax planning and the resultant deviant taxpayer’s behaviour to evade taxes unethically. The author concludes that morality has little role to play in tax legislation while dictating taxpayer’s behaviour to evade taxes. Also, the article looks into the different forms of tax evasion and the measures taken to tackle the issue by the Indian government and tax administrations globally. The author concludes that even though prima facie the tax planning mechanism by taxpayer appear to be a proper tax saving scheme the veil needs to be uplifted to look at the substance rather than the form. Then only the unethical and illegal practices arising out of tax planning in the form of tax evasion can be ruled out.
Introduction
Tax planning is defined as the strategy of “logical analysis of a financial situation or plan from a tax perspective, to align financial goals with tax efficiency planning. The purpose of tax planning is to discover how to accomplish all of the other elements of a financial plan in the most tax-efficient manner possible” (Investopedia, n.d.). Tax planning is a lawful method to keep the incidence of tax at the minimum level by making effective use of various tax exemptions, deductions, rebate, relief, beneficial circulars and judicial rulings and at the same time discharge the tax obligations properly. Tax avoidance, on the other hand, is a device which takes advantages of the loophole in the law to reduce/avoid or transfer one’s tax burden. Tax evasion is, on the extreme end, avoiding tax liability by dishonest means like concealment of income, falsification of accounts, etc. Tax evasion devices are unethical, and evasion once proved, attracts heavy penalties and also prosecution. The line between planning and evasion is a fine one and one rarely agreed upon in recent history.
James and Nobes (1996)[1] maintain that, on the one hand, there are degrees of culpability in tax evasion, whilst in tax avoidance, there is sometimes a distinction to be made between the straightforward mitigation and the complex artificial schemes of minimising tax payments. The hybrid word of ‘avoison’ implies that both evasion and avoidance may in some circumstances be indistinguishable. Hence there is not just a fine line between avoidance and evasion but a foggy grey area. The ultimate effect is the inevitable loss of revenue to the tax authorities and consequently to the society at large.
The term ‘aggressive tax planning’ in a way moves away from this legal distinction between tax evasion and tax avoidance. Aggressive tax planning or tax aggressiveness according to Lanis and Richardson[2] can be broadly defined as the downward management of taxable income through tax planning activities. It thus encompasses tax planning activities that are legal, or that may fall into the grey area, as well as activities that are illegal. Moreover, they argue that the term can be used ‘interchangeably with tax avoidance and tax management. (2012: 86) According to Back[3], it is proposed that “tax avoidance, while legitimate, can be seen as aggressive when it involves using financial instruments and arrangements not intended as or anticipated by, governments as a vehicle for tax advantage” (2013).
Nonetheless, the impact of aggressive planning can render the distinction between tax evasion and tax avoidance obsolete. As Shaviro[4], arguing that aggressive tax planning threatens the functioning of the tax system, points out, ‘At a certain point, although it is hard to say exactly where, aggressive planning merges into outright cheating’ (2004: 24).
Ethical dimensions of Tax Planning
The ethical dimension to tax planning provides an insight into the deviation in the taxpayer’s behaviour leading to tax evasion ways and techniques. Being aware of taxpayers’ responsiveness to tax rules, tax legislatures may use tax legislation to steer taxpayer behaviour by creating a kind of command and control environment. Incentives should be considered, along with coercion and persuasion, as an alternative means of exerting power and influence over taxpayers’ behaviour (Grant, 2002)[5]. Interestingly, the legislative, regulatory measures assume taxpayers to behave as economic–rational people, although there are many more circumstances and factors affecting actual taxpayer behaviour, besides purely economic reasons, as for example the economic–psychological research on tax compliance shows (Kirchler, 2007)[6]. Individual behaviour and the willingness to change one’s behaviour according to government’s wishes are also dependent upon internal motivations that ‘develop from attitudes and values, such as feelings about the legitimacy of group authorities or about people commitment to the group’ (Tyler, 2011: 26)[7]. The consequence of this assumed economic–rational behaviour may, however, be an incentive for actual economic–rational behaviour, for it may stimulate taxpayers to adopt a dominant economic rationality in their tax decision-making process. The dominance of the economic–rational perspective may crowd out important legal–ethical principles in the taxpayers’ decision-making process, such as the principle of equality and the ability-to-pay principle.
Such rule-based regulations often come with a lot of supervisory power and bureaucratic controls and thus create a legal ‘command-and-control’ environment (Braithwaite, 2005: 145–149).[8] In such an environment, it is easy to lose sight of important legal–ethical principles enshrined in the law, both for the legislature and the taxpayer. Tax statutes establish a rule-based context to encourage and even control the behaviour of the taxpayers, and the taxpayers will play with the rules. The focus of both legislature and taxpayer is on rules, not on ethical behaviour. As a result, a dominantly rule-bound regulatory and compliance focus is likely to undermine a more principle-based ethical thinking. This may cause both actors to (consciously) ignore tougher issues that a more ethics-focused approach might demand (Berenbeim and Kaplan, 2007: 2)[9]. Moreover, and by analogy with, empirical economic–psychological research, it can be argued that in a command-and-control environment of coercive tax legislation, where people feel they have very little influence, a crowding-out effect of intrinsic motivations – such as ethical considerations – to comply with the law, may occur (Frey and Jegen, 2002: 594–595)[10]. In that case, not only actual ethical thinking is undermined but even the motivation to so to think[11].
On the one hand, tax legislatures and taxpayers share a focus on rules. This mind set prevails in the interaction of these two fiscal actors. Tax statutes establish a rule-based context to control the behaviour of taxpayers and taxpayers will play with the rules. On the other hand, these tax rules are often muddled, complex and inconsistent. That may render compliance with the rules more difficult. What is more, businesses may maintain that bending the rules may qualify as compliance, be it creative compliance with the letter of the law. Here, complying with the rules is taken in the sense of complying with the letter of the law. However, the letter of the law is often a poor instrument for guiding taxpayer behaviour, for example, because it is often unclear how the letter of the law should be interpreted. Moreover, as we have seen, taxpayers may comply with the law and still pay no tax at all. Also, tax behaviour may be within the letter of the law but take the form of creative compliance. The essence of creative compliance is that it escapes the intended impact of the substantive law. Creative compliance is not just a tax issue but a much more general law issue. Actually, it is an ethical position based on a strict separation of law and morals. Shklar maintains that this is a distinctive feature of ‘analytical positivism’ that leads to (excessive) formalism, which views the law as ‘a discrete entity, discernibly different from morals’. Thus the law is treated as a formal, self-contained system of norms that ‘is ‘‘there,’’ identifiable without any reference to the content, aim and development of the rules that compose it’. To her mind, this idea of law is ‘the very essence of formalism’ (Shklar, 1964: 33–34. Formalism, therefore, does not deny the importance of ethical considerations, only that they lie outside the realm of law. Moral convictions are only put outside the legal system in order to keep it pure. (Shklar, 1964: 41)[12].
Consequently, formalism, as a way of compliance, itself reflects a moral stance. Taxpayers engaging in creative compliance are acting upon personal, subjective convictions that cannot be legally enforced because law and morals are seen as distinct entities. Thus, creative compliance uses formalism to avoid legal control, for example, a tax liability. Taxpayers may comply with the letter of the law, whilst totally undermining the rationale behind the words (McBarnet, 2003: 229–230)[13]. They evade the spirit of the law through loopholes or creatively interpreting its requirements to avoid substantive compliance (Interestingly, the public at large and politicians seem to share a very broad understanding of the spirit of the law, Dowling, 2014: 174). Hence, they do not pay their fair share.
In the common law tradition, concerning forbidden actions, a distinction has been made between malum in se and malum prohibitum. In a malum prohibitum situation, it may be enough that we obey the law only as much as is necessary – the letter of the law – and not more. On the other hand, in a malum in se situation, the norm has a strong moral content, so it is important to follow the spirit of the law. In a malum prohibitum situation, it may be enough that we obey the law only as much as is necessary – the letter of the law – and not more. On the other hand, in a malum in se situation, the norm has a strong moral content, so it is important to follow the spirit of the law. Ostas[14] makes a similar distinction between the concepts of compliance and cooperation: Yet, compliance embodies a less expansive duty than does cooperation. At its heart, the distinction highlights the difference between the letter and the spirit of the law. One complies with the letter of the law; one cooperates with the law’s spirit. Furthermore, Ostas states that in the context of tax law the malum prohibitum views are often dominant: In fact, when it comes to tax law, it seems likely that a businessperson could ethically defend most decisions to exploit tax loopholes, to take an ‘‘aggressive tax posture’’ interpreting ambiguities in light of the businessperson’s private interest, and to lobby for reduced levels of taxation. When it comes to tax, and possibly other matters that constitute malum prohibitum, the societal norm seems to be ‘‘comply,’’ not ‘‘cooperate”[15].
Methodologies of Tax Planning and Tax Evasion
Domestic Practices: Reflections on Indian Scenario
Systems and methods of tax planning: The systems and methods of tax planning, in any case, will depend upon the result sought to be achieved. Broadly, the various methods of tax-planning will either be short-range tax planning or long-range tax-planning[16].
The short-range tax planning has a limited objective. An assessee whose income is likely to register unusual growth in a particular year on account of say, the sale of a capital asset like house property, as compared to the preceding year might plan to invest the same in bonds of National Highway Authority of India or Rural Electrification Corporation Limited to claim exemption under section 54EC. This has a locking period of 3 years. Such a plan does not involve any permanent or long –term commitment and yet it results in substantial tax saving. This is an example of short-range tax planning.
The long-range tax planning, on the other hand, may not even confer immediate tax benefits. But it may pay-off in none too distant future. For instance, in the case where an assessee transfers certain shares to his spouse, the income arising from the shares will, of course, be clubbed with the transferor’s income. However, if the company subsequently issues bonus shares in respect of those shares the income arising from the bonus shares will not be clubbed with the transferor’s income. Similarly, the income arising out of the investment of the income from the transferred assets will not also be clubbed with the transferor’s income. Long range tax planning may be resorted to even for domestic or family reasons.
Therefore there are two roads to the taxpayer’s final destination of minimising tax liability- one through legitimate tax planning as explained above and other is through tax avoidance or tax evasion. There are many instances where the taxpayer has compromised on compliance with the ethical standards of tax law by taking advantage of the loopholes in the tax legislation. Thus such action of evading tax by resorting to concealment, misrepresentation or wilful omission of any portion of the income, wealth, turnover or receipts of the taxpayer amounts to tax evasion which is illegal and unethical. Taxpayers tend to avoid taxes by resorting to unfair accounting and business practices which are as follows:
- Claiming personal expenditure as business expenditure;
- Claiming capital expenditure as revenue expenditure;
- Treating revenue receipt as capital receipt;
- Accounting for amount paid as “Salaries” as business expenditure by classifying the same under different account heads like conveyance, tour and travel, employee welfare, etc.;
- Altering the form of transaction;
- Breaking up of large value contracts with smaller contracts to avoid attracting TDS provisions;
- Breaking up of cash payments in respect of expenditure to escape disallowance of such expenditure;
- Transferring their income/property to avoid tax, etc.
- Splitting up the turnover of excisable goods and excisable services in order to claim scale exemption;
- Not disclosing correct turnover figures in case of excisable goods excisable services;
- Resorting to unfair practices while valuing goods or services for the purpose of paying excise duty, customs duty and service tax respectively;
- Misclassifying goods and services to avoid excise duty, customs duty and service duty.
The intentional non-disclosure or concealment of the income, be it fraudulent or not on the part of the taxpayer amounts to tax evasion which is in stark contrast to tax planning which is mitigation of tax within the letter of the law.
Global Practices on tax evasion:
The global international tax framework reflected in countries’ domestic law and bilateral tax treaties assumes that multinational companies will pay tax somewhere on their cross-border income. Generally speaking, it is envisaged that income will be taxable either in the country where the income is earned (the source state) or the state where the multinational is headquartered (the residence state) – depending on the nature of the cross-border activity undertaken by the multinational.
A fundamental concern is that international tax standards, both concerning domestic law and bilateral arrangements, have not kept pace with developments in the global economy. But it is difficult for any country, acting alone, to fully address these issues. In some cases, it reflects gaps and inadequacies in the design of domestic laws. Countries’ domestic rules for taxing multinationals on their worldwide profits (“controlled foreign company” (CFC) rules) may be inadequate. In other cases, countries’ rules for taxing investment into their country may be undermined by the use of related party debt funding to strip out profits. In some instances, certain transfer pricing practices (i.e. “mispricing”) result in base erosion and profit shifting. These practices are particularly prevalent in relation to multinational profits generated by brands, intellectual property or digital services that are highly mobile and can be located anywhere in the world but can also exist in relation to the pricing of extractive resource-related contracts, for example.
Another set of problems arises from complex interactions between different countries’ tax rules. For example, one country may classify a local entity like a company. But the country where the investor in that entity is resident may treat the investor as the direct owner of the assets of the company. That is, that second country does not recognise the existence of a separate legal entity between the investor and the assets. These types of “hybrid entities” can be used to claim the same deduction in two countries and may result in unintended double non-taxation. Similar double non-taxation problems can arise from mismatches in the way different countries classify instruments as being either debt or equity[17].
For instance, global firms such as Starbucks, Google and Amazon have come under fire for avoiding paying tax on their British sales. Companies have long had complicated tax structures, but a recent spate of stories has highlighted some tax-avoiding firms that are not seen to be playing their part. Starbucks, for example, had sales of £400m in the UK last year but paid no corporation tax. It transferred some money to a Dutch sister company in royalty payments, bought coffee beans from Switzerland and paid high-interest rates to borrow from other parts of the business.
Amazon, which had sales in the UK of £3.35bn in 2011, only reported a “tax expense” of £1.8m.
And Google’s UK unit paid just £6m to the Treasury in 2011 on UK turnover of £395m. Thus tax dodging by multinationals by huge margin represents the sophisticated means of tax evasion being employed thereby placing an immediate action for cooperation between countries to tackle it.
Ultimately, base erosion and profit shifting has adverse implications for the important task of actual tax collection. Efficient administration of many income tax systems depends upon the voluntary compliance of taxpayers. Voluntary compliance is adversely impacted by perceptions of unfairness. If multinationals don’t pay their share of tax, this is perceived as unfair, and that perception may undermine voluntary compliance by other taxpayers.
Tackling Tax evasion: The Way Forward
The OECD[18]/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Project provides governments with solutions for closing the gaps in existing international rules that allow corporate profits to disappear or be artificially shifted to low/no tax environments, where little or no economic activity takes place. The BEPS measures were agreed after a transparent and intensive two-year consultation process between OECD, G20 and developing countries and stakeholders from business, labour, academia and civil society organisations.
Undertaken at the request of the G20 Leaders, the work to address BEPS is based on the 2013 G20/OECD BEPS Action Plan, which identified 15 actions to put an end to international tax avoidance. The plan was structured around three fundamental pillars: introducing coherence in the domestic rules that affect cross-border activities; reinforcing substance requirements in the existing international standards, to ensure alignment of taxation with the location of economic activity and value creation; and improving transparency, as well as certainty for businesses and governments[19].
As far as Indian scenario is concerned the Government has tried to curb tax evasion by incorporation of clubbing provisions, transfer pricing provisions in relation to international transaction and specified domestic transaction, introduction of new taxes, provision of mechanism for enforcing furnishing of annual information return, increasing the scope and enforcing compliance of tax deduction provisions, etc.
India has been one of the pioneers and major contributors of the OECD BEPS initiative and is actively pursuing the BEPS agenda. India introduced some proposals to adopt OECD BEPS recommendations as part of the proposals in the recently announced Union Budget 2016–17. Perhaps the most significant change is the incorporation of the concepts of master file and country-by-country reporting in the Indian transfer pricing regulations as of 1 April 2016[20].
Here are some of the major initiatives taken by the Indian government to curb tax evasion:
1) The Union Cabinet on May 2014, approved the constitution of a Special Investigating Team (SIT) to implement the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court on large amounts of money stashed abroad by evading taxes or generated through unlawful activities.
2) The Black Money (Undisclosed Foreign Income and Assets) and Imposition of Tax Act, 2015’ came into force on July 1, 2015, to specifically and more effectively deal with undisclosed income.
3) For the investigation of Panama Paper leaks, the government brought in Constitution of Multi-Agency Group (MAG) with officers of the Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT), Reserve Bank of India (RBI), Enforcement Directorate (ED) and Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU).
4) India has been collaborating with foreign governments to facilitate and expand the exchange of information. For instance the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreements (DTAAs) has been signed with tax havens like Mauritius and Cyprus.
5) Global efforts to combat tax evasion and black money were taken by joining the Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement in respect of Automatic Exchange of Information (AEOI) and having an information sharing arrangement with the US under its Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA).
6) The government is also trying to automate information exchange with several countries, including Switzerland, to clamp down on black money. For this, so far, both India and Switzerland have agreed to speed up work on the Automatic Exchange of Information (AEOI) and make it possible by 2018.
7) The recently cleared amendment to Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Amendment Act, 2016 indicates the resolve of the Government of India to control the menace of black money and its by-product Benami transactions with the new stringent law and its effective implementation which was predominately an anti-black money measure with the purpose to seize unknown property and prosecute those indulging in such activities.
8) An information technology based ‘Project Insight’ was introduced by the Income Tax Department to strengthen the non-intrusive information-driven approach for improving tax compliance and effective utilisation of available information.
9) The Income Declaration Scheme, 2016 was announced recently, which is like a one-time amnesty-like compliance window for citizens to declare their undisclosed income. Under the scheme, persons can declare their undisclosed income and pay tax, surcharge and penalty amounting to 45% of the total undisclosed income. Here, the income declared will be taxed at 30% plus a ‘Krishi Kalyan Cess’ of 25% on the taxes payable and a penalty at the rate of 25% of the taxes payable, amounting to 45% of the income declared under the scheme, a DNA report said[21].
10)Finally the government’s decision to withdraw Rs. 500 and Rs. 1000 notes from circulation in a shock move was designed to tackle widespread corruption through illicit financial flows and ultimately to combat tax evasion.
Conclusion
Reduction of taxes by legitimate means may take two forms- tax planning and tax avoidance. Tax planning is wider in range. The distinction between ‘evasion’ and ‘avoidance’ is largely dependent on the difference in methods of escape resorted to. Tax avoidance is an instance of merely availing, strictly in accordance with law, the tax exemptions or tax privileges offered by the government. On the other hand, tax evasion are manoeuvres involving an element of deceit, misrepresentation of facts and falsification of accounting calculations or downright fraud. However, between these two extremes, there lies a vast domain for selection a variety of methods which, though technically satisfying the requirements of the law, in fact, circumvent it with a view to eliminating or reduce the tax burden. It is this method which constitutes ‘tax avoidance’.
The focus of both legislature and taxpayer is on rules, not on ethical behaviour. As a result, a dominantly rule-bound regulatory and compliance focus is likely to undermine a more principle-based ethical thinking. Taxpayers may comply with the letter of the law, whilst totally undermining the rationale behind the words. They evade the spirit of the law through loopholes or creatively interpreting its requirements to avoid substantive compliance. Hence, they do not pay their fair share. When it comes to tax, and possibly other matters that constitute malum prohibitum ( to obey the law only as much as is necessary) and the societal norm seems to be ‘‘comply,’’ not ‘‘cooperate”. Thus there is a huge gap between law and morality in terms of tax compliance which leads to large scale tax avoidance eventually.
The ways and means employed domestically as well as globally to avoid tax clearly indicates the difference between tax planning and tax evasion. The intentional non-disclosure or concealment of the income, be it fraudulent or not on part of the taxpayer amounts to tax evasion which is in stark contrast to tax planning which is mitigation of tax within the letter of the law.
In the wake of tax evasion issues the government of India brought a series of measures as outlined in the article in the form of stringent legislations, bilateral cooperation with different jurisdictions for exchange of information on black money, transfer pricing provisions in relation to international transaction and specified domestic transaction, introduction of new taxes, provision of mechanism for enforcing furnishing of annual information return, increasing the scope and enforcing compliance of tax deduction provisions etc. In this respect, the OECD BEPS Project is laudable for addressing the global issue of tax evasion by corporations and creating a robust mechanism in place to ensure there is no tax evasion under the garb of tax planning structure. Thus even though prima facie the tax planning mechanism by taxpayer appear to be a proper tax saving scheme the veil needs to be uplifted to look at the substance rather than the form. Then only the unethical and illegal practices arising out of tax planning can be ruled out.
References:
- James, S. and Nobes, C. (1996) The Economics of Taxation- Principles, Policy and Practice, Hemel Hempstead, Prince Hall Europe, pp.100-105.
- Lanis R and Richardson G (2012) Corporate social responsibility and tax aggressiveness: an empirical analysis. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 31: 86–108.
- Back, P. (2013, April 23). Avoiding tax may be legal, but can it ever be ethical? Guardian. Retrieved October 10, 2014, from
- Shaviro DN (2004) Corporate Tax Shelters in a Global Economy: Why They Are a Problem and What We Can Do about It. Washington: The AEI Press.
- Kirchler E (2007) The Economic Psychology of Tax Behaviour. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tyler TR (2011) Why People Cooperate: The Role of Social Motivations. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Braithwaite J (2005) Markets in Vice: Markets in Virtue. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 226–256.
- Berenbeim RE and Kaplan JM (2007) The convergence of principle- and rule-based ethics programs: An emerging trend. The Conference Board, Executive Actions Series, March 2007, No. 231.
- Frey BS and Jegen R (2002) Motivation crowding theory. Journal of Economic Surveys 15(5): 594–595.
- Shklar JN (1964) Legalism: Law, Morals, and Political Trials. Cambridge/London: Harvard University Press
- McBarnet D (2003) When compliance is not the solution but the problem: From changes in law to changes in attitude. In: Braithwaite V (ed) Taxing Democracy: Understanding Tax Avoidance and Evasion. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, pp. 229–243.
- Ostas, Daniel T.: Cooperate, Comply, or Evade? A Corporate Executive’s Social Responsibilities with Regard to Law. American Business Law Journal 4/2004, pp. 559-594.
- http://www.icaiknowledgegateway.org/littledms/folder1/chapter-14-tax-planning-and-ethics-in-taxation.pdf
- http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/tax/BEPS_note.pdf
- https://home.kpmg.com/xx/en/home/insights/2016/06/beps-action-plan-india.html
- Gribnau H (2015) Corporate Social Responsibility and Tax Planning: Not by Rules Alone. Tilburg Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 09/2015
- Knuutinen R (2014) Corporate Social Responsibility, Taxation and Aggressive Tax Planning. Nordic Tax Journal 2014:1.
- J.C. Hemels, ‘Fairness: A Legal Principle in EU Tax Law’ in: C. Brokelind, Principles of Law: Function, Status and Impact in EU Tax Law, IBFD Amsterdam 2014, p. 413-437
- Pooja Jaiswar (2016, July 30). Nine measures taken by government to curb black money. Zee Business. Retrieved from http://www.zeebiz.com/india/news-govts-initiatives-to-curb-black-money-4340
- http://oecdinsights.org/2015/10/05/plans-to-tackle-tax-avoidance-announced/
- Stainer A., Stainer L. and Segal A (1997). The Ethics of Tax Planning. A European Review. Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1997.
- Philippa Foster Back (2013, April 23). Avoiding tax may be legal, but can it ever be ethical? The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/avoiding-tax-legal-but-ever-ethical.
- Grant RW (2002) The ethics of incentives: historical origins and contemporary understandings. Economics and Philosophy 18(1): 111–139.
[1] James, S. and Nobes, C. (1996) The Economics of Taxation- Principles, Policy and Practice, Hemel Hempstead, Prince Hall Europe, pp.100-105.
[2] Lanis R and Richardson G (2012) Corporate social responsibility and tax aggressiveness: an empirical analysis. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 31: 86–108.
[3] Back, P. (2013, April 23). Avoiding tax may be legal, but can it ever be ethical? Guardian. Retrieved October 10, 2014, from
[4] Shaviro DN (2004) Corporate Tax Shelters in a Global Economy: Why They Are a Problem and What We Can Do about It. Washington: The AEI Press.
[5] Grant RW (2002) The ethics of incentives: historical origins and contemporary understandings. Economics and Philosophy 18(1): 111–139.
[6] Kirchler E (2007) The Economic Psychology of Tax Behaviour. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[7] Tyler TR (2011) Why People Cooperate: The Role of Social Motivations. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
[8] Braithwaite J (2005) Markets in Vice: Markets in Virtue. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 226–256.
[9] Berenbeim RE and Kaplan JM (2007) The convergence of principle- and rule-based ethics programs: An emerging trend. The Conference Board, Executive Actions Series, March 2007, No. 231.
[10] Frey BS and Jegen R (2002) Motivation crowding theory. Journal of Economic Surveys 15(5): 594–595.
[11] Gribnau H (2015) Corporate Social Responsibility and Tax Planning: Not by Rules Alone. Tilburg Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 09/2015
[12] Shklar JN (1964) Legalism: Law, Morals, and Political Trials. Cambridge/London: Harvard University Press
[13] McBarnet D (2003) When compliance is not the solution but the problem: From changes in law to changes in attitude. In: Braithwaite V (ed) Taxing Democracy: Understanding Tax Avoidance and Evasion. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, pp. 229–243.
[14] Ostas, Daniel T.: Cooperate, Comply, or Evade? A Corporate Executive’s Social Responsibilities with Regard to Law. American Business Law Journal 4/2004, pp. 559-594.
[15]Philippa Foster Back (2013, April 23). Avoiding tax may be legal, but can it ever be ethical? The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/avoiding-tax-legal-but-ever-ethical.
[16] http://www.icaiknowledgegateway.org/littledms/folder1/chapter-14-tax-planning-and-ethics-in-taxation.pdf
[17] http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/tax/BEPS_note.pdf
[18] The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is an intergovernmental economic organisation with 35 member countries, founded in 1961 to stimulate economic progress and world trade.
[19] http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/tax/BEPS_note.pdf
[20] https://home.kpmg.com/xx/en/home/insights/2016/06/beps-action-plan-india.html
[21] http://www.zeebiz.com/india/news-govts-initiatives-to-curb-black-money-4340
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